1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA				
2	CHARLESTON DIVISION				
3	JEREMY GLENN AHLUM, ET AL. :				
4	VS.				
5	:				
6	TOWN OF RIDGELAND, ET AL. : 9:10 CV 3227 SB				
7					
8	Motion hearing in the above matter held Thursday,				
9	April 28, 2011, commencing at 10:49 a.m., before the				
10	Hon. Sol Blatt, Jr., in the United States Courthouse,				
11	Courtroom III, 81 Meeting Street, Charleston,				
12	South Carolina, 29401.				
13					
14					
15	APPEARANCES:				
16	MARIO A. PACELLA, ESQUIRE and JOSEPH P. STROM,				
17	JR., ESQUIRE, 2110 Beltline Blvd., Columbia, SC, appeared for plaintiffs.				
18	TIMOTHY A. DOMIN, ESQUIRE, 126 Seven Farms Dr., Charleston, SC, appeared for defendants.				
19	MORGAN S. TEMPLETON, ESQUIRE, 145 King Street,				
20	Charleston, SC, appeared for defendants.				
21					
22	RECORDED BY ANNA LANAHAN, ESR				
23	TRANSCRIBED BY DEBRA L. POTOCKI, RMR, RDR, CRR Official Court Reporter for the U.S. District Court				
24	P.O. Box 835 Charleston, SC 29402				
25	843/723-2208				

THE COURT: Gentlemen, I've been over your briefs, and I want to talk about standing, to start with; I think that's the best thing to do. And I'd like to ask the plaintiff, whoever is going to speak for the plaintiff, a question. So who is going to handle the argument for the

MR. PACELLA: Your Honor, I will.

THE COURT: All right. You've got three plaintiffs who sent their money in, the bond money in, and didn't show up, and, of course, the money was forfeited. And you've got two who went down or had a lawyer go down, and their cases were dismissed. And you've got three who asked for a jury trial and proceeding through the state system.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir.

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plaintiff?

THE COURT: Now, if I were to determine -- I haven't concluded this -- but if I were to determine that the three who forfeited the bond had, in effect, pled guilty to a violation of a traffic law, and that the two who the case were dismissed don't have any constitutional claim, and that the three who are proceeding in the state system, that I shouldn't interfere with the state, and I should let them go up through state system to the Supreme Court or wherever they wanted to go, and then come into this court; if I held that, you wouldn't have any plaintiffs.

Do you agree with that?

MR. PACELLA: I agree, Your Honor, if those were your conclusions. I will dispute whether those conclusions are appropriate, but that is correct. That would be a correct -- Correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So that's why I think that we need to get the standing before we go into whether or not these different causes of action have any merit or don't have any merit.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: So that's what I want to know.

Now, since the plaintiffs -- I mean the defendants have -- we're here on their motion -- Well, we're here on your motion to amend your amended complaint, and we're here on the defendants' motion to dismiss your complaint. I guess we better get a complaint before any motion to dismiss can be heard, because you've got to decide what the complaint is.

As I recall, you filed a complaint, then you filed -- they moved to dismiss, and then you moved to amend your complaint.

And I think I'm right; before they moved to -- which they moved to dismiss, but before they could move to dismiss, you filed a motion to amend your amended complaint.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir. And the reason for that is we received documents --

THE COURT: I mean, you didn't add any parties to -the motion to amend your amended complaint only adds facts, as
I understand.

MR. PACELLA: That's correct.

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THE COURT: Doesn't add any parties.

Well, normally, unless the amendment is futile -- I mean at this stage of the proceedings I always -- normally I would allow an amended complaint, because it's only a few months old. However, if the amendments that you propose are futile, then it wouldn't be any use to allow the amendments. And your big amendment, as I read it, is your first amended complaint where you add these parties. You only had three to start with, didn't you?

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir, then we added five additional parties.

THE COURT: That was in your first amended complaint.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You didn't add any parties in your motion to amend your amended complaint.

MR. PACELLA: That is correct. At that point we were moving to add additional facts that we discovered through a Freedom of Information Act request.

THE COURT: Well, let's discuss these issues, since you're moving to amend to make them parties. Let's discuss these eight people in separate — the three who forfeited their bond, and the two who were dismissed and the three who have asked for a jury trial and are waiting for the trial.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Now, you tell me why your first three don't fall into those who violated the traffic laws, and, therefore, under the law, a forfeiture is the equivalent of a guilty plea. And, of course, a guilty plea, you waive all your rights. If they fall into that category, then they're not proper parties. And you explain to me why they didn't violate the traffic laws of South Carolina.

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MR. PACELLA: Thank you, Your Honor. I think there are basically two main arguments, two main reasons why these aren't actually bond forfeitures within the context of South Carolina law that would amount to a guilty conviction, or a conviction that has guilt attached to it for a subsequent civil proceeding.

The first reason is that we've alleged that they actually haven't had a bond forfeiture proceeding in the Town of Ridgeland. There was actually no proceeding, this is just merely an entry in the court's docket system, and that the case wasn't called on the record to determine if anyone appeared to challenge that bond. So that's the first and main point that we want to make is that there wasn't a bond forfeiture proceeding. At least that's what we've alleged. And the response filed by iTraffic in their motion to dismiss, their documents that they filed were not transcripts of the court proceedings, rather, docket entries that were made in the computer system 7:00 o'clock at night, when the alleged

conclude from the record that they have, that this is categorically a traffic offense.

So the two points --

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THE COURT: Are you arguing that going anywhere from 11 to 15 miles over the speed limit on a public highway or interstate is not a traffic offense?

MR. PACELLA: They were charged with careless operation of a motor vehicle. Your Honor, if our clients were charged with speeding under the South Carolina Code, the analysis would be exactly what you just said, Your Honor. But they didn't choose to charge them with the speeding violation that is in the Traffic Code of South Carolina, of the South Carolina Code; they chose this municipal ordinance, which is more inclusive than just on the roadway.

And so from a pure factual matter, Your Honor, that may be correct, but from a legal standpoint, this statute is — this ordinance is more inclusive than just the roadway. So our point is the reason why each of these three individuals have standing to bring an action at this time is because there was no — the Court did not have a bond forfeiture proceeding. We've alleged that. And there's no evidence of an on-the-record proceeding in court to determine guilt. Or to determine that the bond was actually forfeited, that anyone appeared, or anything that would constitute a prosecution in the court.

And then the second argu --

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THE COURT: Would they have to prosecute them if they didn't show? I mean, what kind of prosecution would you have?

MR. PACELLA: Well, the prosecutor — there has to be an arm of the state to prosecute the action. The Municipal Court itself cannot do the prosecution of the case. Because there is a case, we actually have it cited in our briefing, regarding a Newberry magistrate judge who was actually prosecuting individuals. And the Court said you can't do that. So there has to be a person for the state, in this case an officer from the Town of Ridgeland, to be in the courtroom when these bond forfeiture proceedings take place. And there's no evidence that that actually took place.

THE COURT: All right, sir, go ahead.

MR. PACELLA: And we were talking about these three plaintiffs. Plaintiff Emery, according to the documents that iTraffic submitted in response — or in their motion to dismiss, is that his bond was paid a day after court. So he would have had to have been tried in his absence, for that to be a valid bond forfeiture proceeding. For his bond to be forfeited, he would have had to have been tried in his absence, and there's no record that plaintiff Emery was tried in his absence.

THE COURT: Is there any record that any of the three were tried in their absence?

MR. PACELLA: There is no record that there was a trial in the absence for any of the parties.

THE COURT: Well, just those three.

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MR. PACELLA: Right, right, that's right, for those three. There's no -- any of those three parties. We haven't moved on to any of the other parties, so that's what I'm focusing on at this point.

THE COURT: And that's your position about why they didn't violate -- why they don't come under the forfeiture amounting to --

MR. PACELLA: Your Honor, the main argument is that there was no forfeiture proceeding in court. That's the main argument. Now, it may be simple as the traffic officer reading the names of the tickets and verifying that no one has appeared, and then for the judge to find bond forfeiture, have a finding of a bond forfeiture, that may be as simple as the proceeding needs to be. But it has to be some proceeding, not just a clerk in the office making an entry in the computer system.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, you admitted in the complaint that a bond was posted.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir. Bond was posted, absolutely correct.

THE COURT: All right, sir, let me hear from the defendants about that. We'll just take them one at a time.

MR. PACELLA: Okay, thank you, sir.

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MR. DOMIN: Your Honor, Tim Domin, I'm here on behalf of the Town of Ridgeland, its police chief, Chief Woods, and --

THE COURT: You represent everybody but the i whatever it is?

Your Honor, under South Carolina law, if bond is put up, there's no requirement to conduct a trial in absentia or hearing in absentia. And that is South Carolina Code Section 56-5-2660. And what they want to seize on is that applies if it's any traffic violation or traffic law of this state, or political subdivision thereof, which is why they want to get

MR. DOMIN: ITraffic, that's right. That's right.

into the strained argument that somehow speeding on I-95 is not a traffic violation. Clearly, that is a traffic violation.

And I want to make certain that the Court understands how strained this argument is. Of course, in one instance, driving on I-95 clearly is operating on the roadways of this state. There is no question about it. They want to suggest that the Town of Ridgeland's ordinance is broader, because it states that it is illegal to drive in a careless manner on the public ways of the state.

Now, I'm not aware of any situation where Ridgeland's applying that to railroad tracks, is applying that to driving

on bike paths or anything of the sort. That applies to careless operation on the roadways.

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Now, I will say to you, if somebody is drunk driving on our sidewalks, I hope that that is also a violation of the traffic laws of the state. I mean, I don't think that there's any place for that.

And state law, state law talks about defining public ways. That's where they get their definition from, is from the Motor Vehicle Code, which says public ways include things like the sidewalks and appurtenances thereof. And again, that makes a lot of sense. Because we don't want people driving drunk on the sidewalks. You don't want people committing traffic offenses using their vehicle on the appurtenances to the roadway. But to somehow turn this whole thing on its head and suggest that those are not — that the careless operation by driving 81 miles an hour on I-95, that that's not a traffic offense, turns the definition of traffic offense on its head. And I just don't think that any reasonable interpretation can support the view that careless operation of a motor vehicle is not a traffic offense.

And, you know, all the municipalities here in South Carolina have enacted these careless operation laws, because it allows them to charge a fine, but the motorist doesn't have points assessed against their driver's license. So by and large, people who got charged with speeding are the ones who

would want to come in and ask for a careless operation. So all the towns around here, all the towns in the state for the most part have these careless operation of a motor vehicle ordinances.

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There is no question, and they're not raising the question that we have the authority to enact that law. We have the authority to enact that law. And the only question is, is that a traffic offense; and clearly it is.

THE COURT: Well, they also raise the question that there was no forfeiture proceeding. What's your position about that?

MR. DOMIN: If you read South Carolina Code
56-5-2660, if a bond is put up, you're not required to try
them in absentia, you're not required to have further
proceedings. And under the Truesdale case, it's equivalent to
a guilty plea.

So it is true that certain proceedings would apply to General Sessions offenses, certain bond forfeiture proceedings and/or trials in absentia, that by state law do not apply to traffic offenses. The only question is whether this is a traffic offense. And with due respect, speeding on I-95 is a traffic offense.

THE COURT: All right, sir. Have you got anything else you want to --

MR. PACELLA: Well, Your Honor, I certainly think

it's valuable to realize that there are multiple doctrines which prohibit these folks from relitigating their cases.

Res judicata, Heck versus Humphrey, as well as the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. All of those have been briefed.

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And I think that Your Honor is keying in on the correct issue. Because these folks who have pled guilty, their case is over. And that is what they've done, they've pled guilty. By putting a bond up, by South Carolina State law, they have pled guilty. And if you plead guilty, you can't then come in with a civil action and attack that guilty plea.

THE COURT: Well, how long did they have -- when did the forfeiture change into a guilty plea?

MR. DOMIN: Well, under 56-5-2660, it says that the Town is not allowed to set the ticket date any sooner than ten days. Somebody is allowed to appear and voluntarily enter an appearance and say I wish to waive that ten-day requirement. But what the statute does say, if they've paid up their money and so long as more than ten days have passed, that is a forfeiture and a guilty plea for which the Town does not have to conduct a trial. And it only applies to traffic offenses, but it certainly applies to these offenses.

So to answer your question, I think it is on the time when they put up the money and ten days has passed, that's when it becomes a guilty plea.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

MR. TEMPLETON: Morning, Judge Blatt, Morgan Templeton on behalf of iTraffic. I'll be very brief.

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THE COURT: Take as long as you want.

MR. TEMPLETON: That's all right, Judge, I know we have other issues to deal with, and I'll be very succinct. I want to incorporate by reference Mr. Domin's arguments that he has presented already to the Court, because they're equally applicable to iTraffic.

The one other point that I would like to highlight for the Court is that the one circuit-level court that has had an opportunity to review this constitutional standing issue which the Court is focusing on, is the Fifth Circuit. And we've cited the two Bell decisions that really — and they're in the context of a photo traffic enforcement context. Those decisions come down squarely on the side that folks that have pled guilty or had their day in court with respect to their traffic violation, the game is up. They have no constitutional standing because there's been no injury.

The Tenth Circuit, in a different factual context, has language in it that talks about activities that make criminal activity more difficult, don't qualify as an injury-in-fact for Article III standing purposes. And that's exactly what we have here, Judge. These folks presumably violated the law, they posted a bond, and under South Carolina state law, the Truesdale case that Mr. Domin cited, that is tantamount to a

quilty plea. And so for the three folks that have posted their bond, they had their opportunity to contest, chose not to, and with due respect to those men, their day is up and they need to live by the decision that they made, and can't come to this Court to try to undo that which they voluntarily chose to do. For the additional reasons that Mr. Domin cited, the Heck versus Humphrey argument, under the -- and there's a couple of cases cited in our brief in the RICO context, that you can't take under the premise of a civil lawsuit, and present facts that would necessarily impugn the validity of a criminal conviction. You can't go through the back door, if you can't walk through the front door. And that's what these three are trying to do.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

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MR. TEMPLETON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'll be glad to hear from the plaintiff or anything in reply.

MR. PACELLA: Your Honor, the traffic ticket which is -- it's the second page of Exhibit A to each of our versions of the complaint, each of the iterations of the complaint actually tells a different --

THE COURT: Wait a minute now, let me get it.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir.

(Brief interruption in proceedings.)

THE COURT: All right, sir, I've got it now.

MR. PACELLA: There's several paragraphs. This is 1 2 actually very difficult to read in this document. But the 3 second-to-last paragraph on the right-hand side, the right 4 column states, "However, if you are not required to appear in 5 the court on the assigned trial date and have previously 6 posted bond --" 7 THE COURT: Wait a minute, let me see. 8 MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir. 9 THE COURT: Where are you reading from? 10 MR. PACELLA: The right-hand column, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 12 MR. PACELLA: The second-to-last paragraph, begins 13 with however. 14 THE COURT: However. I see that. 15 MR. PACELLA: "-- if you are not required to appear 16 in court on the assigned trial date and have previously posted 17 bond and do not appear on the trial date, your bond may be 18 forfeited unless the judge has agreed to have your case heard 19 at -- " I think that says another time. 20 So the ticket is actually saying there's going to be a 21 proceeding on that date even if you pay your bond. That's 2.2. what the ticket says. 23 THE COURT: Let's see again how -- Read that again 24 and tell me how you arrive at that conclusion.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, Your Honor. "However, if you are

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not required to appear in court on the assigned trial date and have previously posted bond and do not appear on the trial date, your bond may be forfeited, unless the judge has agreed to have your case heard at another time."

THE COURT: Well, and as to these three people, did the judge agree to hear it at another time?

MR. PACELLA: That's not the point. That's not the operative language in this paragraph, Your Honor. The operative language is "and do not appear." Well, there has to be a proceeding to determine if someone appeared on the designated trial date, according to the ticket. And that's our understanding of the South Carolina Code.

THE COURT: Do you contend that you appeared?

MR. PACELLA: Pardon?

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THE COURT: Do you contend that you appeared?

MR. PACELLA: That our clients appeared? Your Honor, that's not what we're contending. What we're contending is there was no bond forfeiture proceeding; therefore, the bond forfeiture doesn't constitute a guilty conviction which would prevent them from litigating the matter here. That's what we're contending.

THE COURT: They posted the bond and --

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: -- this tells them that you may be forfeited, the bond be forfeited unless the judge does

something, which wasn't done. And the time expired under South Carolina law, the ten days.

MR. PACELLA: Or on the trial date.

THE COURT: Sir?

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MR. PACELLA: It expires from the ten days or on the trial date.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, I don't know what the trial date was, but -- I don't know how long it was. But they didn't do anything either within the ten days or within the trial date. They didn't take any action. They posted their bond, but they didn't do anything else.

MR. PACELLA: Your Honor, it is our contention that there was no proceeding in court to have a bond forfeiture, as required by South Carolina law.

THE COURT: Now, you're taking the position that there's got to be a judge on the bench, and the police officer or whoever is handling it for the Town has got to come in and offer this ticket or whatever it is with the notice, and say that this defendant has never appeared, and, therefore, we move to have the bond forfeited?

MR. PACELLA: Your Honor, actually I'm making it even simpler than that, Your Honor. I am arguing that they have to have an officer in the courtroom, they have to read the roll of the people who pay their bonds to ensure that no one is in the courtroom.

THE COURT: Where do you get that kind of law from? 1 2 MR. PACELLA: Well, Your Honor, this is actually --3 there is a court hearing that date. There has to be a 4 hearing, according to the ticket. And we have to -- where we 5 get that is this is a court of record and this is going to be 6 a determination of an adjudication of guilt. 7 THE COURT: Don't they tell them, if you don't show up, your bond's going to be forfeited? 8 9 MR. PACELLA: That's right. They actually say that 10 in the ticket. They also say there's going to be a trial that date. 11 THE COURT: No, where did they say trial? 12 1.3 MR. PACELLA: Well, if you don't appear on your 14 designated trial date. 15 THE COURT: If you don't appear in court -- Where do 16 you read --17 MR. PACELLA: Same paragraph, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 19 MR. PACELLA: "However, if you are not required to 20 appear in court on the assigned trial date and have previously 2.1 posted bond and do not appear on the trial date." So there's 2.2. an opportunity, you could pay your bond and go to court and 23 have a trial. 24 THE COURT: You can post your bond. You don't pay

It doesn't become paid unless you don't show up.

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MR. PACELLA: That's correct terminology, Your Honor, you post your bond, you go to court, and when they call your case, you stand up and say I want a trial.

THE COURT: But if you don't do any of that. If you don't go down there, you take the position that they've got to -- what you're taking the position is they've got to call your case, so to speak.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: And see if you're in court.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: The State against So-and-so, Town against So-and-so, and see if that person is in court. If that person isn't in court, they forfeit the bond; that's your position, as I understand it.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And if that person is in court and he wants a trial, they give him a trial then. If he wants a jury trial, they wait till they have a jury trial.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: But you take the position that they've got to call his case, so to speak.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And he can't forfeit his bond -- well, you take the position -- does that mean then that he's got to go -- if he doesn't show up, and they call his case, then they

can forfeit, they can forfeit his bond. But your position is they've got to call his case.

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MR. PACELLA: Yes, that is the position, Your Honor. They have to call the case, and there could be a bond — and then when the case is called, if the person did not appear, then the bond forfeiture — then there could be a bond forfeiture under the statute that's been cited by the defendants.

THE COURT: And then you take the position that the law requires, the notice requires that or the law requires that, and that wasn't done.

MR. PACELLA: Sure, I mean, there's --

THE COURT: What happens then if the person just doesn't do anything?

MR. PACELLA: Well, Your Honor, that's — the point of it is, what we're challenging is whether — what we're arguing is that if they don't have that bond forfeiture proceeding, as simple as I've described it in open court, then this payment of the ticket, the posting of the bond and the subsequent keeping of the money by the Town, does not result in a guilty conviction which would — and then, therefore —

THE COURT: Which they waived all that.

MR. PACELLA: -- would include a civil suit. And there's a case, Richland County --

THE COURT: Would preclude any kind of suit.

MR. PACELLA: That's correct.

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THE COURT: All right, sir, I think I understand your position. Let me hear what the defendants say about that particular part of the argument.

MR. DOMIN: Calling the case is not required.

There's no law that says you have to call the case. Second, none of these people allege that they showed up. None of these people alleged that they said I'm here and I want to have my trial.

Third, at every Municipal Court in the state there's some process of figuring out who's there and who's not there. I mean it may not be that they have to call every case, but ultimately they determine who's there and who's not there. These people not being there, paid their — posted their bond, and then ultimately forfeited the bond by virtue of them not being there. There's no factual dispute. They were not there. They don't have an opportunity then to say — and we think this is very consistent with Section 56-5-2660.

THE COURT: What does that section say?

MR. DOMIN: Essentially says you're not required to conduct a trial in the event somebody posts a bond. If they post bond --

THE COURT: I got all these sections; I'm not sure where they are. Anyway, read me, what does this section you're talking about say?

MR. DOMIN: I did not bring the exact -- I did not bring the entire section, Your Honor. It refers to, Your Honor, that the posting of a bond -- if it is a traffic case, the posting of the bond does not then require there to be a trial, in that you must provide at least the ten days, but that after the ten days, that the bond may be forfeited. And so under those circumstances, all the Municipal Courts and the Magistrate's Courts, they don't have to call each case and try it in absentia.

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And the idea that they need to call the case and say is so-and-so here, is so-and-so here, is so-and-so here, there's no law that says that. There's no law that says they have to go down the list of people who have forfeited bond, in order to see that they're there. I mean, they're trying to impose a requirement that no South Carolina case and no South Carolina statute has, and that no Municipal Courts are doing.

THE COURT: Well, these people don't contend that they ever went; these three people don't contend that they ever showed up or anything.

MR. DOMIN: Right. If you look, what was their intent, Judge? Obviously they paid their money, and under South Carolina law, posting bond and not showing up, constitutes a guilty plea. And to me, to suggest that they can avoid that by saying that their name was not called out to see if they were there, seems a bit counterintuitive, because

they're not claiming that they were there. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Do you have anything 3 else you want to add? 4 MR. PACELLA: Not on that issue, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay, you got anything else? 5 6 MR. TEMPLETON: No, Your Honor, nothing further. 7 THE COURT: Now let's get then to the two who had --8 they didn't appear themselves, but they had lawyers who 9 appeared and the case was dismissed. Now, what rights of 10 theirs have been violated? What constitutional rights. 11 MR. PACELLA: What constitutional rights have been violated as to the specific individuals who --12 1.3 THE COURT: The two. 14 MR. PACELLA: -- who have been dismissed, whose cases were dismissed? 15 16 THE COURT: They go to court, they sent a lawyer to 17 court, they don't go themselves, they sent a lawyer to court. 18 And when he goes there, I don't know what happened, but 19 anyway, the charges were dismissed. I recall the patrolman 20 said there were two tickets or two individuals issued the same 21 ticket number or something like that; I've forgotten what it 2.2. was. 23 MR. PACELLA: Yeah, after about ten minutes of 24 argument, yes, then the officer ended up --

THE COURT: I don't know what happened on the other

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MR. PACELLA: And the other one, Your Honor, was dismissed because the -- just dismissed before court started. By the officer.

THE COURT: I see. Now, what rights have they got that have been violated?

MR. PACELLA: Well, Your Honor, this is —
admittedly, this is not a custodial seizure, a Fourth

Amendment arrest, because there's no taking of my clients into custody. But they were arrested. The ticket constitutes an arrest. There's a noncustodial arrest. Which due process, the Fourteenth Amendment due process of law does have —
provides some protections.

And the question is, does this conduct shock the consciousness of the Court that would make that an unconstitutional arrest that would give them rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

THE COURT: Your position is that under the Fourteenth Amendment it's got to -- and the Fourth -- it's got shock the conscience of the Court, sending them a traffic ticket?

MR. PACELLA: Your Honor, actually I think it's a little more involved than that. And I think this goes really to the heart of our case and goes to the heart of what we're contesting. These are municipal officers, Your Honor, they

have limited jurisdiction, limited territorial jurisdiction to the municipality. There is a South Carolina case that extends that within three miles for hot pursue and for offenses committed in their presence. It does not give them jurisdiction to make an arrest and effect an arrest out of their jurisdiction.

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We have a statute, South Carolina Code 5-7-110, which lays out the jurisdiction. There's some exceptions when there's a contract with another jurisdiction, hot pursuit within three miles, or in the investigation in another jurisdiction with an agreement with law enforcement in that other jurisdiction.

There are three cases. State versus Morris, State versus McAteer, and then a month ago, month and a half ago,
March 14th, 2011, State versus Boswell, that essentially just says exactly that, you can't go outside of your jurisdiction to make an arrest. That's what they're doing. And they're doing it knowing that this statute was in place. These cases came out — first one came out in '89, that's the Harris case; McAteer came out in 2000. Then they're continuing to do it after State versus Boswell. The officers are exceeding their jurisdiction. And that's not the only problem here, although that is the heart of the problem, that the officers are going beyond their jurisdiction.

We have alleged that the officer doesn't even write the

ticket. That's being taken -- that's being done by iTraffic, by the private company. The officer doesn't make the determination of probable cause. That determination is also made by iTraffic. The officer doesn't serve the ticket --

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THE COURT: You don't deny there was probable cause, because you don't admit they -- you don't contest that they were speeding. I mean, I haven't seen any denial that the people weren't violating the law. I mean, is there any of the plaintiffs come in and said -- I haven't seen any of them say I wasn't going 81, I wasn't going 85.

MR. PACELLA: Actually, Your Honor, that is in the pleadings, Mr. Leebrecht (phonetic) has alleged that it's not even him. He's not the one of the two that you're focusing on at this point, but he's one of the ones that asked for a jury trial. It's not even -- he's alleged it's not even him.

THE COURT: I know, we'll get to the jury trial people later.

MR. PACELLA: Right.

THE COURT: I'm talking about the ones that we're discussing, the two here, I hadn't seen that they denied they were violating the speed law.

MR. PACELLA: Your Honor, that's pretty interesting.

It's really something that's kind of difficult to determine whether you were speeding at that time at that location.

Because there -- you could have -- because of the way they do

this procedure where they're not stopping you, you don't know -- if you had someone with you who could be your witness that -- to say, look, I looked at the speedometer and we were going 72 miles an hour or 71 miles per hour. There's no way for you to -- some GPS systems can capture your speed. If someone turns on some traffic lights, you could push a button and capture your speed to have some evidence that you could present to a jury.

So actually, Your Honor, the reason why this is so offensive and so procedurally flawed, is that you are deprived of your opportunity to even defend yourself.

So to say -- for our clients to --

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THE COURT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute. How does it deprive you of an opportunity to defend yourself?

MR. PACELLA: To gather the evidence that you would have, if -- If you were stopped immediately for speeding by the officer, you would be able to recognize who was around you, maybe talk to the people in your car about that exact moment versus another moment in time or another location. You would be able to use -- if you have a GPS system that allows you to capture your speed, you'd be able to push a button and it could capture your speed, you could bring that into court as part of a trial. There are a number of things that you could do that you're deprived of in this method of traffic enforcement.

But more than that, Judge, the officer doesn't write the ticket. That's being done by iTraffic, by the private company. The officer doesn't make the probable cause determination, the officer doesn't even mail the ticket. The mayor testified before a Senate subcommittee that it's mailed by the Town Hall. So he's not even — the officer's not even trying to serve the ticket by mail.

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The letter that they send in conjunction with the ticket conflicts. They say different things. One says that won't go on your traffic record, that's the letter; the other says it will. The letter says that, you know, a bench warrant may be issued, they're threatening different kinds of prosecutions that go along --

THE COURT: They dismissed all of this.

MR. PACELLA: But that doesn't change the fact that there was an unconstitutional arrest at the time they received the ticket. It doesn't change the offensive conduct that took place. And it was dismissed, which essentially is a finding of not guilty.

And they have constitutional rights, just like if — if there is an unconstitutional arrest and someone goes through trial and wants to bring suit, they have that opportunity to bring suit.

You know, in this process they also tell people that when they send you a ticket, they have a web site that you can go

to, to actually pay your ticket and give you information.

That website says that if it's not you, you still have to pay the fine, or you've got to come to court.

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And we talked about not holding bond forfeitures in open court. There's actually another point that's not in our pleadings, and I am going to recognize that it's not in our pleadings, but I would like to tell the Court that. We do not believe that there's been any jury trials to date, even though the program's been going on since July. And I think that that is sort of a telling situation, in addition to the two people who were dismissed when we went and appeared in court for them, trying to adjudicate their — have their rights adjudicated by the judge.

So to tell you why these two individuals whose tickets were dismissed have rights, well, they have rights because this is an unconstitutional arrest, not a Fourth Amendment violation, so it's a higher standard that we have to show that that arrest shocks the consciousness. But these factors that I point out, think — even the officer going outside of his jurisdiction alone should be enough to shock the conscience of the Court, but when you combine all of those factors, that becomes a Fourteenth Amendment violation, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. DOMIN: There's no constitutional violation by mailing a ticket. Your Honor, first of all, the Fourth

Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. This is clearly not a search. They want to argue that it is a noncustodial arrest. Respectfully, under federal jurisprudence, mailing a ticket to someone is not a seizure. I mean, first of all, it defies the common sense notion of what a seizure is. We in no way stopped them or detained them. Under federal law, a seizure is determined to be a situation where a reasonable person would believe they're not free to leave. These people leave; there's no — there's absolutely no reasonable person who would believe that they are not free to leave, simply because a camera took a picture of them.

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So we don't think that this qualifies as a federal constitutionally-protected Fourth Amendment seizure. It just does not rise to that level. And, in fact, we have cited to you case law that would indicate that providing a ticket to somebody, even if you're going to detain them for some period of time to give them a ticket, is not a seizure. But clearly, mailing a ticket to them would not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.

Your Honor, they have cited to you three state law cases that say that officers cannot arrest outside their jurisdiction. All of those are Common Pleas offenses — General Sessions offenses, I should say — for which the person — the officer actually was outside — completely

outside the jurisdiction, and made an arrest that was, in some situations, based upon conduct that occurred outside the jurisdiction, but, in part, was triggered by conduct that started in their jurisdiction.

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In the most recent case, the sheriff found that somebody was going into women's houses and stealing women's clothes, and he tracked it back to another county, and a person had a house in another county, and he saw this person pull up and then start throwing women's clothes in the woods. And he effectuated an arrest, because he knew that this was the same fellow who had been stealing clothes back in his county.

Again, he effectuated a custodial arrest.

In this situation there's no dispute that the offense is committed within the officer's presence. There is an officer in the van when the photographs are being taken, who is able to exercise his discretion and say, that vehicle was not speeding. Or, more likely, we didn't get a clear picture of that vehicle; we can't tell if it's that truck or that car; so we're able to throw that out. The officer there in the van is able to throw that out before it goes any further.

The offense itself is committed within the officer's observation and within the Town of Ridgeland, which is within his jurisdiction. So these cases are not similar to those General Sessions cases that the plaintiffs would cite to you.

Your Honor, the folks who receive these tickets are not

deprived of any -- any right -- any federally-protected right.

And I would submit hypothetically, some 15 states have got these traffic camera type programs. If there's some federal constitutional reason why you're not able to mail tickets to people, then they would be illegal in every single state. It wouldn't be any different in South Carolina versus someplace else.

If --

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THE COURT: Just because there's no law and they haven't raised it somewhere else, doesn't mean it can't be raised.

MR. DOMIN: Well, I agree with that, Your Honor.

But, in these other states the decisions uphold these traffic cameras. And the key -- really what the plaintiffs are complaining about is that state procedural law has been violated. They are contending that state procedural law requires a ticket to be hand served on somebody. That's not a federal requirement. It's not -- there's nowhere in the United States Constitution where it says that a ticket must be handed to you in person as opposed to being mailed to you.

If they want to take that issue to State Court for some kind of a state declaratory judgment, or for that matter, if they want to have one of these tickets appealed up to the South Carolina Supreme Court, they can get a decision of that issue. But it's not a federal constitutional issue.

And none of these folks have been deprived of any rights. These folks specifically that we were talking about, the folks who appeared and who their cases are dismissed, they received due process, they got the opportunity to appear in court, and the system worked. The system worked because the tickets were dismissed. They could raise any issues they want. And that there were no fines assessed as a result of them, and there were no collateral consequences as a result of these tickets.

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So we don't think that we've taken away any rights of any defendants, but surely not this category of defendants.

They're the ones who got their day in court, and ultimately those tickets were dismissed. Thank you.

MR. TEMPLETON: Again, Judge, for the record, I adopt by reference Mr. Domin's arguments completely, I think he captured the essence of the argument.

Focusing back, the three points that I would want to leave the Court for its consideration on these, with this class of person, is, first and foremost, the standing issue.

The argument that has been made is that there's been a constitutional challenge, in essence, a due process violation. The due process had worked. They had their day in court, they appeared through counsel. And right, wrong or indifferent, the tickets were dismissed. Thus, there's no damage. That's point two, there's no damage here. Every day across America, across this state people are accused of crimes, they have

trials, they have hearings, cases get thrown out all the time.

The system works. And it worked in this instance.

With respect to the three state cases talking about the custodial arrest, that's a huge point. Those were custodial arrests. This is, at best, a noncustodial arrest. So those three cases have no application.

Which takes me to my third point. There is no statute in South Carolina that requires that the ticket be served personally. There is no statute that requires it be mailed by certified mailed or some process server. To the contrary, Section 56-7-20 contemplates and uses the word given, G-I-V-I-N-G. Given. E-N, not I-N-G. Given to the offender in the context of the uniform traffic ticket. These tickets were given. They were given vis-a-vis the United States mail service, but there's no language in that statute that requires it be personally given at the time that the ticket is issued.

So with respect to the category of folks whose claims or charges were dismissed, there is no constitutional injury here, there's no violation of any constitutional or state protected claim.

Thank you.

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MR. STROM: Your Honor, can I reply to that?

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. PACELLA: Your Honor, we talked about shocking the conscience of the Court. I mean, let's think about what

we have here. We had a camera system that originally was working without the officers in there. And then there was an Attorney General's opinion that said the officer had to participate, so officers start appearing. This thing is fully automated. Somebody comes down the road, the radar apparently goes off, a flash goes off, it takes a picture of the driver, takes a picture of the back of the car so it can get the license tag. All this is computer generated.

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What we've alleged in our complaint is the officer is sitting there, and he's then watching, I guess. information is then taken to what I refer to as the girls at City Hall, who are paid for by the private company. And those women go on line to the various Highway Department websites and pull up pictures of the person who owns the car, based on the license tag. And they look at that picture, and they look at the picture of the person that was captured driving the vehicle, and they make some determination as to whether or not this is the right person. I think. We've alleged in our complaint that the officer does not participate in that. And that's where probable cause lies. You've got to determine whether you are charging the right person. And they have delegated that to a staff person. The officer may be in the vehicle, in the van watching it come by and match up the car and the speed and all of that, but he is not, as it is alleged in our complaint, participating in confirming that that was

the person driving the car. And then the girls or someone at Town Hall mails these tickets.

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So, you know, this is a criminal charge, and this is service. And in all the years I've been practicing law, there are rules on how you serve process. And I've never seen process served by regular mail. It's clearly — and our complaint alleges that these people, these officers and the girls, I mean, so we've got this camera stop, we've got no probable cause determination by a police officer, we've got it mailed out of the jurisdiction.

Further shocking, as our complaint alleges, they get a uniform traffic ticket, but they get a separate letter from the police chief who says it — the ticket says that a bench warrant will be issued. The letter says that if you pay your bond — and all these are exhibits in the complaint — that there won't be any points against you. They're inconsistent.

And then you're given a court date. And there's no process at the court date. There's no process. There's no determination, there's -- you know, I've been in hundreds of magistrates courts in this state, everybody has a tape recorder and this stuff is read on the record. You've got a city police department, when they forfeit bonds like this, the clerk calls out the names, and the judge, one by one, checks his list. BF, makes a note on the record, BF, BF, BF, on the docket, that bond forfeiture, bond forfeiture, bond

forfeiture. No process here.

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Then they allege that, well, you ought to just go to State Court and deal with this. Well, we had two clients who came to us, not anything particular, we go down there and they dismiss the cases. And as Mr. Pacella has pointed out, I've called some lawyers from that area -- and if you'll allow us to amend the complaint, I was going to ask you to allow us to add this language. I'm told that there are thousands of jury trial requests pending down there. Thousands. Mr. Lord, sitting right here, my co-counsel, has over 500 himself. Do you know how many jury trials they've given people? That would be zero, Your Honor. That would be zero. And I'm told anecdotally from lawyers down there that there's no way for them to try them. Because the population there is 4000 people; 2000 of them are in jail, in the jail facility. So they don't have enough jurors to try these cases.

So in effect what's happening here is they've -- shocking the conscience -- they've created what I consider the perfect crime. They write these tickets on a local ordinance so there aren't points. People, many of them, don't have the resources to get a lawyer. They're all out of state, because they're going up and down I-95. They get this ticket in the mail, I mean, you know, talking about a class action, this is one of --

THE COURT: I thought one of your plaintiffs was from

Gaffney or somewhere in South Carolina.

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MR. PACELLA: Well, one -- they're all outside the jurisdiction of the Town. We excluded that. So I mean, this thing has just -- it is a for profit operation; we've alleged that in our complaint; if we're wrong about that, if they say it's for safety, let's get an expert and let's have a Daubert hearing about that. I don't think that's the case. But we've alleged that. We've alleged that there's no process at the end of the day in a court that complies with any kind of rules to come up with any kind of determination. We want to amend our complaint to allege they're not giving any of these people jury trials that are part of this class.

THE COURT: That's an amendment that you haven't even filed yet.

MR. STROM: Yes, sir, but we were going to ask. We just learned about this last night, that's right. But those are the issues that shock the -- that should, I hope, shock the conscience of the Court.

And the other standing issue here is all of this is repeatable. Everybody that's a plaintiff of ours, no matter which one of these categories you put them in, they're going to ride down I-95 and be subject to the same thing again. So if they're -- you know, we've got other causes of action listed in here, and that's why all of these people continue to have standing just on that narrow issue, no matter which one

of the categories you put them in.

2.2.

THE COURT: You take the position they can ride up and down 95 at 85 miles an hour all they want to.

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  STROM: No, sir, I take the position that a police officer has to stop you --

THE COURT: I mean, you take --

MR. STROM: -- and serve you with a ticket.

THE COURT: Right there.

MR. STROM: If he's in hot pursue, he can go tree miles outside the jurisdiction. But I take the position they have to serve you with that ticket, and they have to give you a court date. And if you post your bond and you don't show up, they have to have some type of established proceeding.

Now, I'm not saying that it has to be a trial in absence, but I think that the law in this state is that there has to be some established proceeding as to how they handle those cases, other than the girls at 8:00 or 9:00 o'clock at night making some note on a docket.

And if they can prove at the summary judgment stage that there is a proceeding in place where there is some uniform compliance as to how they handle that -- We allege in our complaint there's not, because we do not believe that's the case, based on what we have seen and heard. If they can establish that, then Your Honor's probably right to grant summary judgment against us.

But at this point we've pled, we've pled that there is no process, at the end of the day, where they legally forfeit these bonds. And that's why that first group still has standing. And we've pled that it is illegal to serve somebody out of state or out of your jurisdiction.

You know, those are important points. And we think we've established enough facts, alleged enough facts in this complaint to allow us to look into this thing further. You know, we've moved to amend our complaint because we've got a little bit of a Freedom of Information Act. There's a lot more to dig here. And we think, Your Honor, that we've alleged enough here to be able to continue to proceed.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Anything more y'all want to add?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  DOMIN: Mr. Strom covered a lot of territory, went back to the first category.

THE COURT: I don't --

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MR. DOMIN: I don't know if you're inclined to go back to that.

THE COURT: No, I don't want to go back.

MR. DOMIN: Okay. I didn't want to go back that far either, frankly.

You know, as it relates to these folks in the third category, I call them the third category, but it's the folks who actually appeared and whose tickets are dismissed, clearly

they not only received due process, they availed themselves of it, the tickets were dismissed.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

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Now we go to the third group who requested a jury trial and are awaiting a jury trial. Let me hear from you about why I should go in and interfere with a State Court proceeding.

MR. PACELLA: Well, Your Honor, as you heard from Mr. Strom, there haven't been any jury trials to date, and there may not be any jury trials. These plaintiffs may ultimately fit into the category of the dismissals. But as they presently stand, Your Honor, they're still victims of the same unconstitutional conduct, the same mail fraud, wire --

THE COURT: But you want me to go in and interfere with a pending state matter, that they can, if they don't get justice, if they don't feel they get justice in Ridgeland, that they can go up the state ladder, and then when they finish, come here maybe. But you want this Court to interfere with a pending state proceeding. Isn't that what you're asking me?

MR. PACELLA: No, Your Honor, actually we do not believe we'll ever have that opportunity and they'll ever let us go through state proceeding.

THE COURT: I don't know that, you don't know that.

MR. PACELLA: Well, we've been there twice trying to challenge tickets, and they've dismissed them because they

didn't want rulings going up. I mean, that is clear, I believe is clear, from the two dismissals that we've gotten. We've actually been down there for a third ticket, which was dismissed because it's not in the complaint.

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But, Your Honor, they still have claims for -- because they may be subject to the same conduct again, so they still have claims for injunctive relief as they've been harmed by the initial --

THE COURT: They can't get relief in State Court?

MR. PACELLA: They cannot get -- the municipal judge cannot give them an injunction to prohibit the Town of Ridgeland and iTraffic from having those cameras on the interstate and serving people tickets.

THE COURT: Well, there's nobody, no court in the state system can do that?

MR. PACELLA: Well, Your Honor, the question of whether this putative class action could have been in State Court is a Class Action Fairness Act question. The reason why this is filed here is because of the Class Action Fairness Act.

THE COURT: I mean, but you're asking me to go in and interfere with the State Court proceeding.

 $$\operatorname{MR.\ PACELLA}\colon$$  No, we actually would like those State Court proceedings to go --

THE COURT: I'm talking about in these three cases.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, Your Honor. We'd actually -- I think the State Court proceeding certainly can go forward. We're not asking you to enjoin those proceedings and not let those proceedings go forward. We're asking to conduct discovery in this case, and move forward to seek relief for the people who we believe are victims of this enterprise that was generated by the Town of Ridgeland and iTraffic, to make money for their town as town profits, and as corporate profits for iTraffic. And they've been harmed much in the same way, they had to go out and hire attorneys to adjudicate what is -- to adjudicate their claims in municipal court, and they haven't.

2.2.

THE COURT: Can't they raise all these issues in the State Court?

MR. PACELLA: Certainly, Your Honor, they cannot go in and ask the judge for monetary damages for a RICO claim, they can't ask the judge for monetary damages for their constitutional claims, and they can't ask the judge for any monetary damages. All they can do is ask the judge to dismiss the case. And that's the only authority the judge would have is to dismiss the case, if he found it to be a procedural violation. They can't get any other remedies from the court. And they've been waiting for their trials, been waiting a substantial period of time for their trials. The chief justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court issued an order

saying that magistrate and municipal offenses need to be tried within 120 days. We've exceeded that. We're still waiting.

2.2.

At some point, if the case doesn't get called for trial, at some point they have to have right to be able to bring their action to adjudicate their rights. At this point they have pending charges over their head. Pending charges that we contend to be unconstitutional, violate constitutional law, that they've been subjected to injury to their person or property because mail fraud and wire fraud acts that are part of the racketeering conspiracy. And because of that, they should be allowed to adjudicate their rights. And how long they should wait for their jury trial? Wait till the statute of limitations expires? Because the statute of limitations for the unconstitutional arrest, is when they received the ticket. That's when it begins the run. Doesn't begin to run upon the dismissal of the case.

Because what we're challenging is the conduct that is involved in the mailing. So the only other alternative is to wait and see. And if the town officer never calls the case for trial, then our clients never get a chance to adjudicate their rights. That's not a rational conclusion. They have to be able to adjudicate their rights if they've been injured. And they have been injured, they've hired counsel, we've pled it, they hired counsel to represent them in those proceedings.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

MR. PACELLA: Thank you.

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MR. DOMIN: This category of plaintiffs has all of their rights to assert whatever they want in a State Court proceeding. And under Younger and its progeny, this Court should not interfere with any State Court proceedings.

Now, I submit respectfully that is exactly what the plaintiffs are asking for you to do. They're asking for you to make determinations that there was an illegal arrest or that there was illegal processing or that there was some misconduct related to the probable cause in issuing the tickets. Those are all questions that can be raised in the court of the Municipal Court of the Town of Ridgeland.

There's a judge, and that appeal goes all the way on up to Columbia. They're able to appeal it all the way to the South Carolina Supreme Court, to address any issues that they have regarding all of those issues. All of those issues, they could raise all the way up to Columbia, if they want.

Now, they raise a question as to whether or not jury trial -- if a jury trial is never heard, then what is going to be their right. Well, you know, ultimately all defendants have a right to make a motion for a speedy trial, or, in the alternative, to dismiss the case. There's no question that there are a lot of tickets, and there are some backlogs right now. The chief justice, as was just referenced, Chief Justice Toal came out with an order recently applicable to the

Magistrates and Municipal Courts, requesting that we dispose of jury trial Municipal and Magistrate Court offenses within 120 days. And that's going to be very hard, and cases could have to be dismissed ultimately as a result of that order. And those people will then fall into a different category. But, for the sake of discussion, if we're talking about a category of people who have cases pending right now, this Court should not interfere.

2.2.

MR. TEMPLETON: Ditto. Judge, exactly. Younger v. Harris, squarely on point for this category. In addition, principles of ripeness are applicable for the Court's consideration, because there's a number of what ifs. You know, what if there's a conviction, what if the jury trial goes forward and there's a conviction, what if there's a jury trial and there's a finding of no fault, no conviction, what if there's a dismissal. All of those things raise question marks as to whether -- putting Younger aside -- whether these claims are actually ripe for this Court to consider. As the Court alluded to, perhaps in the future, if the cases matriculate on up to Columbia, depending on how things shake out, there may be something in the future. But as it stands here today, these defendants have an opportunity to raise any defense they believe to be necessary and applicable.

THE COURT: If they can get a trial.

MR. TEMPLETON: If they can get a trial. And if they

can't get a trial, Mr. Domin's exactly right, motion for speedy trial, and in the alternative, motion for dismissal.

Therefore, they're protected that way, and then they fall into the category of defendants that we talked about before.

2.2.

But I would submit, as I did before, in the event that that occurs, the system worked. Perhaps you could say the system failed because defendants weren't tried in a timely fashion, and, therefore, it's an indictment on the system itself.

But what these plaintiffs are asking this Court to do is to declare, because they've asked for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, to declare this program is unconstitutional, to declare that the actions of these officers and the Town are unconstitutional, and put a stop to it. That's the nature of an injunctive relief. And with due respect to the plaintiffs, that's not the proper forum.

THE COURT: Well, the plaintiff says -- I don't know how many thousand cases pending down there. He said he wants to further amend his complaint. I've forgotten the figures, but he says it's impossible to try all those people, with the population down there. Because the penal institution, which surprised me, I learned about the group in Allendale, they count, for voter purposes, you count the people in these penal institutions. And Ridgeland has got -- I guess Jasper County has a big influx for that reason. Now, if they allege the

impossibility of or unlikelihood of being able to try them and 1 2 them getting some decision, I mean, you're taking the position 3 and I'm not saying it's wrong, that this Court shouldn't 4 interfere. But if this Court were to find that -- and he 5 further amends his complaint, and if this Court were to find 6 that it was impossible, it appeared impossible for these 7 people to get a trial to adjudicate their rights, you don't 8 think that might be conduct that would shock the conscience of the Court? 9 10 MR. TEMPLETON: It might, Your Honor. At this 11 juncture it's the first I heard of it was today's argument on 12 that issue. No --13 THE COURT: It's not before the Court, nothing --14 MR. TEMPLETON: Yes.

THE COURT: That's not before the Court now.

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MR. TEMPLETON: Certainly if Your Honor allowed the amendment to occur, we would look at that and see if there's a legitimate basis to contest it under an argument of futility or not. But as we stand here today, it's not before the Court, and I'm not prepared to fully address those questions.

THE COURT: All right, sir. Anything else you want to add?

MR. TEMPLETON: No, Your Honor, thank you.

THE COURT: Anything you want to add in reply?

MR. PACELLA: No, sir, not on this issue.

THE COURT: Let's take about a ten- or 15-minute break. Let me think about this.

(A recess was held at this time.)

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THE COURT: I've given this -- gave it a lot of consideration before I came today, and I'd been over the briefs. And I think the law might be different, or some of the law might be different as to the third group. And as to the first two -- first, I don't believe that it's any constitutional violation to send somebody a ticket and give them the information they were given. That would apply to all three groups.

Now, I think that the first group, I believe that they violated the traffic laws of the state, and that the state law provides for a person who violates the traffic law and forfeits his bond, I don't think there's any constitutional requirement that you've got to hold a special kind of forfeiture procedure.

And I think that the first group, the only way, even if it was a constitutional violation to send them a ticket notice the way they did, they couldn't contest it until having been found — state law making them guilty, equivalent of a guilty plea. I think until they got that guilty plea set aside, they couldn't come into this court, because I think that the Court would not be — wouldn't act — I don't think it's a constitutional violation to start with, but if it were as to

the first group, since they were, on the face of the matter, legally pled guilty, I think they'd have to do something to get their guilty plea set aside before they could come into this court.

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Since I don't feel that there was a constitutional violation, I think the second group, just as their case has been dismissed, and I think that's as far as this court need go with that.

Now, the third group, while I don't think there was a constitutional violation, I can see that under some of the statements that have been made, I'm going to allow the plaintiffs 20 days, or however long they want, to further amend the complaint. I could see that — without giving — I want to give them a chance. I could see — I'm not passing on it because it's not before me — but I could see if they make some allegation, and I'm just using the words that there are 4000 cases down there ready to be disposed of, and the impossibility of getting a trial, some allegations like that may create a constitutional violation. I could see those people who couldn't get a trial, and then refuse trials.

So I'm going to allow the plaintiff to -- How long do you want? You said you wanted to amend your complaint; how long do you want? I'll give you all the time you want, you just tell me.

MR. PACELLA: Your Honor, just ask for 30 days

instead of 20 days.

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THE COURT: All right. Then I'll give y'all 30 days to file any motions you want to file. But I just don't believe that sending — that there's any constitutional violation that this Court should recognize from the fact that the officer didn't stop them right there and give them a ticket, rather than mailing — sending the notices out that they send.

And insofar as the first group is concerned, before they could challenge that, even if it was, and I don't think it was, but even if it was, since I think they clearly fit the statutory state statute that they violated the traffic laws of the state, and that they forfeited their bond, and that amounts to a plea of guilty, and when you plead guilty, you waive all your constitutional rights. You waive all your rights. So they'd have to get that -- even if it was a constitutional violation, they've waived that, as long as that conviction is standing. So I think that applies to the first group; they've got two hurdles. I mean they had two hurdles. One, was it a constitutional violation, and two, did they violate the state traffic law. And I said I don't think it was a constitutional violation, and second, I think they did violate the state traffic laws, and they had the equivalent of a guilty plea, and that they waived all their rights.

As I said, the second group, if it was no constitutional

violation, then they've had the charges against them dismissed, and they've reached the end of the rope at the present, as alleged presently.

2.2.

And as to the third group, as the pleadings stand now, I don't see that they've had a constitutional violation any more than the other two. But there may be factors that the plaintiff can allege from the argument, that might change that picture, depending on what is in the complaint. And I think it only fair, since this is not an old case, that the plaintiff be given an opportunity to amend the complaint as to that group. Now, I don't think anybody — I don't know if there are others who have gone down there and had their complaints dismissed. I believe you did mention one other, I thought you said you appeared one other time and had the complaint dismissed. Didn't you say that?

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I thought so. And I don't know, must be hundreds, I guess, who forfeited their bond. And they've got two hurdles to overcome, as I said. Now, they've got the first hurdle of proving it was a constitutional violation, which I don't think it was. But even if they were correct in that, then they've got to overcome my holding that they didn't violate the state traffic law to make that guilty plea -- I mean the forfeiture amount to a guilty plea. Because if the forfeiture amounts to a guilty plea, and then you take the --

with a guilty plea, you waive -- or I tell everybody who comes up all the time, if I accept your guilty plea, you waive all your constitutional rights. So even if they had them, they would waive them with a guilty plea. So they've got to overcome that statute, or the statutory law of the state, plus your constitutional violation. Now, I don't think they can do either.

And I'll just wait to see as to the third group. I don't think they've alleged a constitutional violation to date. But I don't know what they're going to allege in 30 days. So I'm not going to issue any order any time that's going to confirm in an order what I've stated and the reasons.

Now, is there any question, based on what I've said, that any of you have for the Court?

MR. PACELLA: Your Honor, just to be clear.

THE COURT: If you don't mind, come up here.

MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor, this is more procedural to make sure I understand procedurally. The first three plaintiffs are being dismissed?

THE COURT: That's right.

MR. PACELLA: The two plaintiffs that had their cases adjudicated and dismissed by the Municipal Court, their motion to be included in the complaint is denied?

THE COURT: That's right.

MR. PACELLA: Okay. I just wanted to make sure.

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Because they've never been a party to the action. THE COURT: That's right. MR. PACELLA: Thank you, sir. THE COURT: But the last three, I'm going wait to pass on their claims until I see the amended complaint and the pleadings to that. MR. PACELLA: Yes, sir. Okay. Anything from y'all? THE COURT: MR. DOMIN: No, Your Honor. MR. TEMPLETON: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: We'll be in recess then. (Court adjourned at 12:36 p.m.) 

## REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION

I, Debra L. Potocki, RMR, RDR, CRR, Official Court
Reporter for the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, hereby certify that the foregoing is a true
and correct transcript of the electronically recorded above
proceedings, to the best of my ability.

S/Debra L. Potocki

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